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Unlike in the United States, in the United Kingdom the use of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs or drones) for targeted killings has generally been “under the radar” due to the 
British government’s longstanding refusal to admit that any such policy exists. That 
approach was subverted in late 2015 when then-Prime Minister David Cameron told the 
House of Commons that a British citizen, Reyaad Khan, had been killed by such a strike near 
Raqqa in Syria.1 On that occasion there was surprisingly little direct comment; but eight 
months later the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) produced its 
Second Report of Session 2015-16: The Government’s Policy on the Use of Drones for 
Targeted Killing2 (Report). The Report is notable for highlighting an apparently new concept 
for the use of force by the U.K. in a foreign country where it is not engaged in a situation of 
armed conflict, as well as the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human 
rights law (HRL)—specifically, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)—to such operations. In particular, the British government 
seems to have arrived at a newly expansive interpretation of the scope and ambit of the 
right of self-defense in international law; and by implication, it is turning the clock back 
fifteen years by effectively adverting to a concept of a “Global War on Terror” that neither 
the U.K. nor any other European state has previously subscribed to. This is a substantial 
realignment of the U.K. position, which had previously shared a European and broader 
international consensus of a less consistently militarized response to transnational 
terrorism.3 At the same time, the government’s position on the application of IHL and HRL 
to such operations is alternately vague and confusing. These new interpretations of 
international law represent a change in official attitudes and perceptions that bring the U.K. 
closer to the policies of the Bush administration in 2001–2008. Despite some clarification 
since the publication of the Report, the British government’s position remains one of 
“contradictions and inconsistencies,”4 and it continues to insist that it does not have “a 
‘policy on targeted killing’. Rather[,] it has a policy to defend the UK and its citizens against 
threats to their security.”5 
Use of Force Without Armed Conflict 
An important preliminary question, which dominates much of the Report, is whether or not 
the U.K. is involved in the armed conflict in Syria. The U.K. has been participating in military 
action against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since 2014; the legal 
basis of the action was stated at the time as being, “in support of the collective self-defence 
of Iraq as part of international efforts led by the United States.”6 In 2013, then-Prime 
Minister David Cameron sought Commons approval for British military action on Syrian 
territory after the reported use of chemical weapons by President Bashir al-Assad’s forces, 
but the government’s motion to authorize airstrikes in Syria was defeated.7 Just over one 
year later, a resolution to authorize airstrikes against ISIL was approved by the House, but 
only on the territory of Iraq, and the text of the resolution made it clear that “any proposal 
to [endorse U.K. airstrikes in Syria] would be subject to a separate vote in Parliament.”8 At 
the time of the Raqqa strike, no such additional vote had been moved and there was 
therefore no parliamentary authorisation for the action on the record. It could accordingly 
have been viewed as illegal in light of the modern constitutional convention in the U.K. that 
military deployments overseas should normally be debated in the Commons beforehand.9 
When Prime Minister Cameron reported the strike to the Commons ex post facto, however, 
he emphasized that it had not been in the context of the armed conflict against ISIL, but 
rather had been an entirely free-standing action: “[A] targeted strike to deal with a clear, 
credible and specific terrorist threat to our country at home.”10 He referred to this as a “new 
departure” for the U.K. and admitted that the Raqqa strike was its first application. Cameron 
stated that as part of the national counterterrorism strategy, the government will always be 
prepared to use lethal force abroad against suspected terrorists who pose an imminent 
threat to the U.K., even if that involves executing a strike on the territory of a foreign state 
where the U.K. is not involved in any armed conflict.11 At the same time, he indicated that 
the operational parameters of the strike were determined by IHL considerations: “The strike 
was conducted according to specific military rules of engagement, which always comply 
with international law and the principles of proportionality and military necessity. The 
military assessed the target location and chose the optimum time to minimise the risk of 
civilian casualties.”12 Government lawyers, responding to a threat of judicial review 
proceedings challenging the failure to publish any existing policies or procedures regarding 
targeted killings, subsequently claimed that the strike took place “in the context of an active 
armed conflict” and that Khan and the two other ISIL cadres killed alongside him were 
“participants” in that conflict.13 
The JCHR accepted that the strike in Syria was in fact part of the same armed conflict in 
which the U.K. was already involved against ISIL in Iraq. This was partly on the terms of the 
U.K.’s notification of the strike to the UN Security Council14 and partly because Cameron’s 
insistence that it was not part of that conflict was imperfectly designed to reassure 
Parliament that the government was complying with the stated exceptions to the 
constitutional convention on the use of force. Under that convention, if there is some 
emergency or critical necessity that renders it inappropriate to seek preauthorization by 
Parliament, the government will act first and report back to Parliament at the earliest 
possible subsequent opportunity.15 Nevertheless, in the sense that the traditional British 
approach to counterterrorism has primarily been seen in terms of criminal law enforcement 
rather than the use of military force,16 the boundaries between those paradigms have 
become blurred.  This is apparent in that the U.K. may now use lethal force in targeted 
strikes against suspects in foreign states with which the U.K. is not at war, rather than 
seeking to have such suspects arrested, investigated, and prosecuted or extradited.17 This 
change in policy gives cause for concern about the expansion of the use of force concept—
there have been reports of British Special Forces destroying ISIL targets in Libya, for 
example.18 On the other hand, it does reflect a growing perception of the imperative to take 
military action against terrorists who are believed to pose a direct and imminent threat to 
the U.K. but who are located in a state where, for one reason or another, traditional law 
enforcement is not seen as a realistic option. In that sense, it aligns the U.K. approach more 
closely with that adopted by the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks. 
 
Self-Defense 
The U.K.’s letter to the Security Council notifying it of the Raqqa strike invoked “the inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defence” in accordance with Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, on the basis that (i) Khan himself was “actively engaged in planning and directing 
imminent armed attacks” against the U.K., and (ii) Khan was a member of ISIL, which “is 
engaged in an ongoing armed attack against Iraq, and therefore action against ISIL in Syria is 
lawful in the collective self-defence of Iraq.”19 Although Cameron only mentioned the U.K.’s 
reliance on the right of individual self-defense, the most important aspects of this 
justification are the U.K.’s understanding of the concepts of “armed attack” and 
“imminence” (the latter not being mentioned in Article 51, but long subscribed to by the 
U.K. in customary international law). 
 
On the construction of an armed attack by non-state actors, the government clarified the 
U.K.’s understanding that the threshold for grave terrorist violence to amount to such an 
attack is where it “reaches a level of gravity such that were it to be perpetrated by a State it 
would amount to an armed attack.”20 That terrorists can commit an armed attack for the 
purposes of self-defense has been widely accepted in international law since 9/11, but 
questions of the level of magnitude, scale, or intensity required for this to be the case have 
been begged by open-ended Security Council resolutions and left unanswered by 
international jurisprudence. Although the U.K. interpretation makes sense per se and seems 
consistent with contemporary opinio juris,21 it does not answer those questions. 
 
As to imminence, the U.K. had previously distanced itself from the post-9/11 U.S. concept of 
preemptive self-defense against remote threats, but government responses to the JCHR 
suggest a conflation with that concept, as it appears the U.K. now favors a more flexible 
interpretation of the concept of imminence. Although as long ago as 2004 the Attorney-
General had averred that the concept needed to be adaptable in the context of evolving 
technology, the new approach suggests obliquely that “[a]n effective concept of imminence 
cannot . . . be limited to be assessed solely on temporal factors. The Government must take 
a view on a broader range of indicators of the likelihood of an attack.”22 As noted by the 
JCHR, the expansiveness of the new approach “raises important questions about the degree 
of proximity that is required between preparatory acts and threatened attacks. Is it enough . 
. .  if . . . an individual is planning terrorist attacks in the UK, or does the preparation need to 
have gone beyond mere planning? Once a specific individual has been identified . . . does 
the wider meaning of imminence mean that an ongoing threat from that individual is, in 
effect, permanently imminent?”23 These, and the “broader range of indicators” mentioned, 
have not been clarified; the implication of a constant state of imminent threat and 
preemptive self-defense is legally uncomfortable.  It suggests, contrary to settled 
international law doctrine, that a state may resort to the use of force in self-defense against 
an indefinitely ongoing situation regarding a designated “enemy,” rather than a specific 
armed attack. Although this has for some years been the position of a very few states 
(principally the U.S. and Israel), it has not previously been subscribed to by the U.K. or the 
large majority of the international community. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the 
understanding that self-defence in public international law justifies a state’s initial recourse 
to force under the jus ad bellum, as opposed to rationalising its ongoing operations in the 
course of a situation of armed conflict. 
 
IHL and HRL 
As current U.K. defense doctrine only contemplates the use of drone strikes within an 
armed conflict paradigm,24 the use of such strikes, combined with statements about 
compliance with IHL (which by definition only applies in situations of armed conflict), 
confirms that the government does see the situation in those terms. The JCHR notes that 
the government’s insistence on a geographically-limited non-international armed conflict 
against ISIL in Iraq and Syria is contradicted by the stated policy of willingness to strike 
outside armed conflict and apply IHL, which in the government’s view meets any obligations 
it might have under HRL; the effect of the two assertions together is that the U.K.’s policy 
“ends up in the same place” as the U.S. policy, which the U.K. has hitherto consistently 
disavowed.25 Finally, the JCHR averred that current jurisprudence requiring the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR to individuals in the physical control of the state 
means that HRL would apply to drone strikes conducted outside of armed conflict where 
there is an imminent threat that cannot be prevented in any other way and the use of lethal 
force is absolutely necessary; but it would be harder to justify British support to U.S. 
airstrikes against more remote threats, such as where the target was, for example, a 
training camp for terrorists with “ill intent in their minds,”26 because the threshold for the 
permissible use of lethal force is much higher in HRL than in IHL. 
The ECHR, in requiring that the state’s taking of life be absolutely necessary (e.g. in defense 
against unlawful violence), strictly proportionate to the aims sought, and followed by an 
effective official investigation, basically assumes that the state will try to detain its enemies 
in order to put them on trial, rather than simply killing them—a “capture rather than kill” 
paradigm. This is unknown to IHL, wherein enemy combatants and other persons directly 
participating in hostilities may lawfully be targeted in any place and at any time as long as 
they are not hors de combat by reason of wounds or sickness, attempting to surrender, or 
already in custody.  
 
Conclusion 
The U.K. government’s application of IHL to the Raqqa strike is consistent with its current 
defence doctrine and its persistent argument that the ECHR does not apply to 
extraterritorial military operations except in limited situations where there is effective 
control of an area or where state agents have personal control over an individual. The JCHR 
blithely assumes that HRL applies extraterritorially to all uses of lethal force in non-armed 
conflict situations (on the basis that killing someone is a clear expression of physical control 
over that individual), but in fact this point remains far from settled in the jurisprudence of 
the English courts, not to mention that of the European Court of Human Rights, to which the 
latest domestic decision27 will surely be appealed in due course. Finally, the U.K.’s newly-
expansive understanding of the imminence criterion for self-defense (very recently 
amplified in a strangely intangible speech by the Attorney-General at the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies)28 aligns with a subjective and potentially abusive appreciation 
of the notion of a foreign state being “unable or unwilling” to counter a terrorist threat 
emanating from its territory29 and risks further diluting the already-hazy broth that is the 
law restraining the unilateral use of force by states. 
                                                          
1
  7 Sept. 2015, Parl Deb HC (2015) cols. 25-27 (UK). 
2
  Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Government’s Policy on the Use of Drones for Targeted Killing, 2015-
16, HC 574/HL 141 (UK) [hereinafter “Report”]. 
3
  See David Turns, The “War on Terror” Through British and International Humanitarian Law Eyes: 
Comparative Perspectives on Selected Legal Issues 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 435 (2007). 
4
  Report, supra note 2, at § 2.2. 
5
  Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Government’s Policy on the Use of Drones for Targeted Killing: 
Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015–16, 2016-17, HC 747/HL 49 (UK), 1 
Appendix: Government Response, 14, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/747/747.pdf [hereinafter “Government 
Response”]. 
6
  Identical Letters Dated 25 November 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the 
President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 26, 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7
  29 Aug. 2013, Parl Deb HC (2013) cols. 1425-1556 (UK). 
8
  26 Sept. 2014, Parl Deb HC (2014) col. 1255 (UK). This was despite the UK’s notification of the action to the 
UN (supra note 6) referring to the purpose of the action as being, “to end the continuing attack on Iraq [by 
ISIL], to protect Iraqi citizens and to enable Iraqi forces to regain control of the borders of Iraq by striking ISIL 
sites and military strongholds in Syria” (emphasis added). 
9
  See The Cabinet Manual – A Guide to Laws, Conventions and Rules on the Operation of Government (2011), 
§§ 5.36-38, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60641/cabinet-manual.pdf. 
10
  7 Sept. 2015, Parl Deb HC, supra note 1, at col.26. 
11
  Id. at col. 30. 
12
  Id. at col. 26. 
13
  Government Legal Department, Letter to Leigh Day & Co., Solicitors §21 (Oct. 23, 2015) available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-
rights/Letter_from_Govt_Legal_Dept_Leigh_Day_231015.pdf. 
14
  Infra note 19. 
15
  Report, supra note 2, at §§ 2.20-29. 
16
  See generally, Turns, supra note 3.  
17
  Report, supra note 2, at §§ 2.31-38. 
18
  See Commons Committee Chairman Urges Clarity over UK Special Forces in Libya, BBC NEWS (May 26, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36392039. 
19
  Letter dated 7 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/2015/688 (Sept. 2015). 
20
  Government Response, supra note 5, at 15. 
21
  See generally Karl Zemanek, Armed Attack, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2013), 
available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e241. 
22
  Government Response, supra note 5, at 16. 
23
  Report, supra note 2, at § 3.39. 
24
  See Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 – The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Mar. 
30, 2011), §§ 502-15. 
25
  Report, supra note 2, at §§ 3.50-55. 
26
  Id. at §§ 3.56-89. 
27
  Al-Saadoon v. Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA (Civ) 811 (Eng.). 
28
  Jeremy Wright, The Modern Law of Self-Defence, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 11 2017) http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
modern-law-of-self-defence/. 
29
  See Brian Egan, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep. of State, International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL 
Campaign, Remarks to the American Society of International Law (Apr. 1 2016), (transcript available at 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/255493.htm)(endorsing publically this standard on behalf of the 
US). 
